An ambitious vision for national security

National Resiliance Hugo Rosemont, security policy adviser at A|D|S, investigates.

The Prime Minister revealed the Coalition’s much anticipated new national security approach with his dual part announcement on 18 and 19 October in ‘A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (NSS)’, and ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)’. These documents did much to set out a full strategy for national security as well as outlining the government’s approach to the management of security risks as outlined in the NSS.Much has been made of the unprecedented nature of the inclusion of security and counter-terrorism alongside defence in the NSS and the SDSR. Have these new documents paved the way for a more integrated approach to the formulation and delivery of UK security policy?

Blurring boundaries
The government argued consistently that the SDSR would, for the first time, go wider than traditional defence issues and include wider security considerations. The publication of the document confirmed this – it includes security issues such as international terrorism, cyber security, border security, UK resilience, serious organised crime and energy security.

Many analysts now agree that the formal convergence of defence and security policy was one of the most significant aspects of this new suite of documents. It has long been a cliché to say that the boundaries between defence and security are blurring but this idea is now firmly cemented into the UK’s strategic approach to security.

In truth, the Conservative Party had been laying the foundations for the development of a more integrated approach to national security policy for some time. As one of his first acts as Prime Minister, David Cameron established a new National Security Council (NSC) for the UK on 12 May 2010. The creation of this new body had been promised within the Conservative Party’s (January 2010) National Security Green Paper: A Resilient Nation.

The NSC already appears to be driving through new levels of cross-departmental cooperation on security policy issues. Whilst many leading figures were justifiably concerned by the hasty nature of the SDSR process, its completion before the publication of the Spending Review on 20 October suggests that it can operate effectively.

If a cross-departmental approach to national security is genuinely emerging, what can be said about resources allocated to the variety of security risks that have been identified? How did the Spending Review affect the SDSR and what were the major investment decisions of relevance to the security industry?

Security after the Spending Review
The 2010 Spending Review declined to “ring fence” national security expenditure. The budgets of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Home Office – both of which contribute to the delivery of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST – were subject to significant overall reductions (7.5 per cent and 23 per cent respectively).

There are differing views in industry on the long-term impacts of the Spending Review on the UK’s defence and security capabilities, and industry itself. What is clear is that both the MoD and the Home Office have been tasked to make substantial budgetary reductions.

On the domestic security agenda, for example, the overall 14 per cent reduction to UK policing expenditure is significant, as are the potential impacts on the private sector supply chain which supports the service.

However, the overall figure of a 23 per cent cut to the Home Office’s overall expenditure does not tell the full story. On the most important issue within the department’s portfolio, counter-terrorism, the Spending Review announced a minimal reduction of ten per cent (over four years) to government spending. The Spending Review makes clear that counter-terrorism must be supported by significant investment.

New areas of investment
The latest government documents also announced that there will be new areas of public sector investment in some vital areas of security. There is now a major focus arising from the SDSR on the UK’s strategy for cyber security and information assurance. This includes a greater allocation of public resources (£650million over four years) to the security of this domain which may offer some opportunities for the security sector.

But if elements of wider security were considered alongside the defence aspects of the SDSR, can the same be said of the security industrial elements of national security policy?

Towards a defence and security industrial policy?
The SDSR explained that it would be followed by a “Defence Industrial and Technology Policy that seeks to secure the independence of action we need for our Armed Forces, while allowing for increased numbers of off-the-shelf purchases and greater promotion of defence exports.”

On 2 November 2010, the Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, Peter Luff MP, and the Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Baroness Neville-Jones, announced at an event hosted by A|D|S that security issues would be included within the (renamed) Defence & Security Industrial and Technology Policy (DSITP).

Announcing the new combination, Baroness Neville-Jones argued that a joint approach to defence and security industrial and technology strategy was needed for a number of key reasons. These included the need for industry to reflect upon the government’s outlook which increasingly treats security and defence as closely linked; the recognition that security and defence challenges are increasingly similar; and the realisation that technology challenges are overlapping, if not identical. Furthermore, technology has a role to play in both security and defence operations and many defence companies are security contractors (and vice versa).

These are solid arguments and the rationale for the Minister’s decision to include security issues in the DSITP is to be welcomed.

An integrated approach
Industry has long argued that opportunities exist to identify areas where defence industrial capability can be deployed more effectively in security and resilience contexts, and vice versa. This new approach should allow the government to harness dual use technologies for effective national security, to identify economic efficiencies and to deliver a coherent overarching framework for industrial policy across both defence and security.

Furthermore, there are some very specific areas where it makes sense to align security industrial and technology policy with defence.

Firstly, there would be benefit in the clarification alongside defence of the industrial capabilities associated with security that the UK would wish to maintain onshore. The definition of what constitutes ‘operational sovereignty’ in national security and resilience is at an early stage of development. The benefit of including operational sovereignty for security purposes in the DSTIP is to provide the UK’s security departments and agencies with assurance that the country has the ability to deliver sensitive capabilities onshore.

Science and technology
Secondly, benefits would be gained from developing an integrated science and technology programme across defence and security policy, and by increasing transparency around the resource choices that different departments and agencies may be considering over sponsoring research and development (R&D) for NS&R purposes. Greater transparency and continued investment in science and technology will ensure that new security capabilities can be “pulled through” for use on the front line by both the military and the civilian first responders. There is a particular need to ensure adequate levels of R&D funding for defence and security purposes.

Thirdly, the UK should strengthen its focus on the export of defence and security capabilities overseas. Like the SDSR process itself, the UKTI Defence & Security Organisation (DSO) brings defence and security together and could support a comprehensive approach to exports across these sectors. It is extremely encouraging that industry and government share the goal of achieving a major uplift in the performance of UK security exports with the government playing a similar role in security to that played in relation to defence exports. A major focus on security exports can help to generate economic growth and influence overseas security arrangements.

Finally, alongside defence considerations it is important that the DSTIP pays special attention to the role played by, and the needs of, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in the security sector. Within the A|D|S membership, SMEs comprise 92 per cent of security-related companies with a heavy focus on upper tier technologies. This part of the security community is highly innovative and more can be done to maximise its contributions to national security and economic growth.

Recognising sector diversity
Whilst aligning industrial policy across defence and security will offer significant opportunities, the DSITP process must recognise that the defence and security markets differ in noticeable ways. It will be important to ensure that the process takes account of the maturity of the national security market, its structure and a variety of other unique characteristics.

These factors are important to take into account because the defence and security markets operate in very different ways. They are also starting from very different baselines.

For example, on the one hand it is widely accepted that the system for defence procurement is in urgent need of reform after decades of neglect. On the other hand, the security market is in some senses immature and it is characterised by a much more diverse range of public and private sector customers.

It will also be important to ensure that as the MoD leads on the defence elements of the DSITP the appropriate government departments involved in security issues – including in particular the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and all security-related departments in the Cabinet Office – are fully engaged with industry in the formulation of the DSITP.

Furthermore, industry believes that new mechanisms will be needed to support the wider security aspects of the DSITP. A|D|S fully supports the main policy recommendation of the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers’ Community (RISC) that there should be appointed within government an authority with the task of driving forward the measures that are necessary to realise the benefits that the security industry can bring, at home and internationally, through greater engagement. The work that flows from the SDSR through the DSITP offers a good opportunity to launch such an authority.

Concluding remarks
At the launch of the engagement for the DSITP on 2 November, Baroness Neville-Jones explained that: “We need a joint effort between government and industry, building on our already fruitful relationship, in order to secure a greater percentage of the global security market.”

The inclusion of security in the DSITP can help to realise this ambitious vision. The country’s new national security posture announced by the NSS, the SDSR and the forthcoming DSITP presents the UK security industry with significant new opportunities; especially around exports and in the development of science and technology for national security purposes. A|D|S and its members look forward to continuing to help to support the country’s national security and economic objectives through an even more fruitful partnership.

Hugo Rosemont is Security Policy Adviser to A|D|S and secretary to the Policy Committee of the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers’ Community (RISC).