Dr Carleen Martin highlights research suggesting that tourism and events organisations in coastal areas remain largely unaware of, and unprepared for, the risks posed by marine-based terrorism, arguing that low risk perception is hindering effective preparedness despite the UK's continuing threat landscape.
Extensive evidence within the data of a recent study has indicated that a marine-based terrorist attack targeting the UK is likely, and that the tourism and event industries operating in coastal areas are currently unaware and unprepared for potential threats. None of the key stakeholders based in the South West of England who participated in the study believed that their location or organisation were a credible target. Many fail or even refuse to prepare for potential threats, demonstrating a very low perception of risk. This is significant because coastal destinations are highly populated areas attracting high-capacity crowds to beaches and events held on or in proximity to water, indicating that residents, visitors and organisations are currently exposed to a heightened level of vulnerability.
Lack of awareness
A lack of awareness that coastal destinations could be a credible target for an act of terrorism was a recurring theme throughout the data. For example, an experienced Harbour Master stated, ‘The chances of us in Cornwall being involved in a terror attack is very remote.’ Similar views were expressed by a freelance Event Manager who stated, ‘Terrorists are more likely to target big cities like London and Manchester. Thankfully, I think down here in Cornwall we exist in a fairly protected bubble.’ When asked to clarify, both participants independently expressed their opinion that there was less risk of Cornwall being targeted in a terrorist attack compared to other parts of the country because of the remote geographical location of the county.
Further concern was raised by an Event Manager who described how a serving police officer on the organising committee for Saltash regatta identified and responded to an abandoned trolley filled with bags that was positioned on the edge of a crowd who had gathered to watch a firework display. The participant claimed that the police officer said ‘no one’s watching’ and pushed the trolley to the other side of the field. When asked if HOT Protocols had been applied to assess the unattended bags the participant stated, ‘No, but it wasn’t likely to be a bomb in Saltash was it!’
There were similar examples within the data relating to key stakeholders for the tourism and event industries based in Devon, Dorset and beyond. The Managing Director of a popular seafront leisure venue in Weymouth confidently stated, ‘Coastal areas won’t be affected by terrorism. There’s nothing here to interest them.’ In a separate interview, the Director of a national chain of holiday parks stated ‘Terrorist attacks are so rare in this part of the world that it’s not something I imagine will ever happen to me. Certainly not in the South West. I do not believe that terrorists would consider the effort it would take to come this far down worthwhile when there are more easily accessible targets up country.’
The views expressed raise serious areas of concern. For example, the participants of the study who are operational in popular coastal destinations were unfamiliar with marine-based terrorism and unaware of what an attack of this nature might look like or involve. This could include water-based targets such as a vessel of any size, or an event taking place on the water such as a regatta. Potential land-based targets in proximity to, or easily accessible from the water include beaches, festivals, hotels, leisure venues or crowds of spectators gathered on the water’s edge.
Crowds of tourists or event attendees in an open public space such as a beach where there is often very little cover and limited means of escape could be considered to be very attractive terrorist target. The suggestion that terrorists would need to travel a considerable way to access the South West, and the assumption that this wouldn’t be worthwhile overlooks the possibility that radicalised individuals could already be living and working within coastal communities. This is important because lone actors often seek local, familiar targets where they can blend effortlessly into the local environment, presenting a significant challenge for the security and intelligence services in terms of detection and interception.
Furthermore, many terrorist organisations, especially those motivated by Islamist Extremism and Dissident Republican Terrorism which pose a sustained threat to the UK have an extended history of successfully planning and executing marine-based terrorist attacks. For example, Al Qaeda are an organisation who have repeatedly demonstrated that time and money are no obstacle to the commitment of their cause and are now in possession of a naval fleet operated by experienced personnel, but the public remain largely unaware of this. So, perhaps the most serious concern should be that the lack of awareness of potential threats, and low perception of risk that was evident has created a significant barrier to effective mitigation that has resulted in many organisations failing or even refusing to prepare.
Failure to Prepare
When participants of the study were asked to discuss how they prepare for potential threats the manager of a tidal sea pool stated, ‘counterterrorism is not necessary in our sleepy little part of the world. We are not likely to be bothered by terrorists here.’ Similar views were expressed by a freelance Event Manager based in Devon who stated, ‘If I’m honest counterterrorism is generally a very low priority for me and the event organisations I work with. It’s just not a good use of our time.’
At face value the lack of preparedness may be surprising, but effective assessment and management of risk depends on the assessor’s ability to identify potential threats. The key stakeholders who participated in the study had very superficial knowledge of terrorism and displayed a lack of emotional connection to the topic. For example, when the Director of a major annual event in Plymouth was asked if they were aware of the current threat level they replied ‘No, sorry. I know it’s quite low. The threat of terrorism in this country generally is very low. It’s not something I feel the need to check too regularly.’ However, at the time of their interview the threat level in England, Scotland and Wales was Substantial meaning an attack is likely.
The Manager for a country park directly accessible from the water expressed frustration that the threat levels are too vague to be of any meaningful value to individual organisations because they refer to the national threat landscape and are unable to provide localised information. Their comments highlighted the difficulty faced by key stakeholders for the tourism and event industries operating in coastal areas when calculating likelihood versus consequence in the context of terrorist risk. This is because the likelihood of any specific venue or location being targeted is very low, even when an attack within the UK is considered likely. Therefore, organisations working with restricted budgets who are unaware of potential threats and fail to see the relevance to them will often consider counterterrorism to be a low priority. The problem is that should they be targeted in an attack, the cost in terms of loss of human life, physical and psychological harm to survivors, economic and reputational damage is likely to be severe. None of the organisations who participated in the study were insured against an act of terrorism.
Dr Carleen Martin
Martin, C. (2025) An investigation of the awareness and preparedness amongst the tourism and event industries of the threat of a marine-based terrorist attack.. Thesis. University of Plymouth. Available at: https://doi.org/10.24382/KYZ0-V694
