Manchester Arena inquiry volume 3 published

Sir John Saunders has published volume 3 of the Manchester Arena inquiry. This volume focuses on how attacker Salman Abedi was radicalised and whether security services missed chances to stop him.

The first report by inquiry chairman Sir John Saunders, was published in June 2021 and focussed on security at the site. It listed a number of failures, including missed opportunities to minimise the impact of the blast. The report also criticised British Transport Police, the arena operators SMG, and the contracted security providers.

The second report, published in November 2022, focused on the emergency response and identified failings by the emergency and security services including that Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service crews took over two hours to arrive at the scene and only one paramedic was on the scene for the first 40 minutes.

According to today's report, MI5 missed a significant opportunity to take action that might have prevented the attack.

The inquiry also found that the bomber Salman Abedi, and his brother Hashem, probably received assistance from someone in Libya.

On the radicalisation of Salman Abedi, Sir John says that there were a number of contributory factors, including his family background and parents' extremist views and participation in the struggle in Libya. However the parents and brother of Salman and Hashem did not give evidence to the inquiry.

The report states: "The Abedi family holds significant responsibility for the radicalisation of SA and HA. That includes their father Ramadan Abedi, mother Samia Tabbal and elder brother Ismail Abedi, each of whom has held extremist views. Their views influenced the development of SA’s and HA’s worldviews. It is also likely that SA and HA fed off each other’s ideas and radicalised each other."

It continues: "Ramadan Abedi took his sons to Libya during the period of conflict. It is likely that SA and HA were involved in combat there. It is probable that SA and HA were radicalised in Libya to some extent and that they obtained some form of training or assistance in how to build a bomb in Libya, as well as counter‑surveillance training."

The report states that Salman Abedi should have been subject to Prevent referral at some point in 2015 or 2016, however, it also states that "None of the educational establishments that SA attended were at fault in failing to identify him as being at risk of being radicalised or drawn into terrorism."

The report also mentions that "The mosques attended by SA and HA were not an active factor or cause in their radicalisation."

There is also a volume 3 (closed) which contains material that would be damaging to national security if it were to become public.

For a detailed insight into the report, read Nick Aldworth's review here: https://counterterrorbusiness.com/features/missed-opportunities-manchest...