Feature

Counter Terrorism Strategy

Achieving National Security Policing

As we are fast bearing down on the ten year anniversary of 9/11, and with the Olympic Games around the corner, it seems a timely juncture for me - as the National lead for Counter Terrorist Policing for England & Wales - to take stock of where we are and to offer some views as to how this critical area of policing might be delivered in the future.

The death of Usama bin Laden is a hugely significant event. It does not though mark the end of the threat. We must all therefore remain alert to the continuing threat from Al Qaeda, its affiliates and those acting alone.

The threat from international terrorism is as severe as it has been for a long time and it has evolved and is evolving in a way that few could have predicted. We must also remain alert to threats from Irish Dissident Republican terrorism highlighted so starkly by the recent murder of Constable Ronan Kerr in Northern Ireland.

Our response to the threat, therefore, has to be equally agile. This means that the likely and proper desire of the current government to examine and review the effectiveness of current policing arrangements must be seen as an opportunity to further improve our response rather than an unwelcome threat to the status quo. We have come a long way in the last five years but that should not breed any sense of complacency.

We have been - and continue to be - able to draw on the significant capacity and capability built up in what is now a national Counter Terrorist Policing network, forged from, and intrinsically interwoven within, the mainframe of UK policing. Indeed, when people talk of policing reform its easy to forget that in terms of CT we have in fact been in a constant state of 'reform' since 2005 and thus have arrived at where we are by a process of evolution and development rather than by accident. 

The Met Police's Counter Terrorism Command (or 'CTC') remains the natural base for a large proportion of the skills and resources, not to mention the operational focus provided by the capital city. The four regional Counter Terrorism Units, and the smaller Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units - fused as they are with their host forces and other local constabularies - were constructed to complement the London-based CTC, and harness the all-important local knowledge, skills and community relationships that are so essential for success in any aspect of delivering counter terrorism policing.

The fact that many recent and significant CT operations have been run from these hubs supported by the London CTC, rather than the other way round, is a tribute to the way the whole network has developed over the past five years.

This is the key strength of our current CT policing arrangements; that proverbial 'golden thread' which links the frontline local police officer with his or her regional counter terrorism hub and thereby makes them an integral part of our national CT policing response. 

I am able also to reach out via my fellow Chief Constables and fine tune our frontline protective security posture across the UK; from advising on target hardening at specific locations to recommending the implementation of additional measures nationwide if necessary. The latter has been a very significant component of our co-ordinated protective security response and uplift over the last twelve months to counter any potential threat of a Mumbai-style attack.

This pyramidal model of Command in counter terrorism policing - from the national lead to frontline nationwide - has been rightly described many times as the envy of our international partners.

Of course, against a burgeoning and ever-diversifying threat backdrop, with budget cuts in other areas of mainstream policing to be managed and the broader background of wider police reform, it is perfectly valid at this point that we should take an objective step back, pan across our current policing structure and ask ourselves if wider structural change in the current CT arrangements is needed?

There appear to be several options. The first and most obvious is to retain the current set up but keep refining and improving them through experience and events. The next appears to pull the current network out of mainstream policing and place it in the soon to be formed National Crime Agency. The third is to morph the current network into a lead Force arrangement with, in all probability, the Metropolitan Police Service, through size, experience, location of threat and expertise, being that Force. The fourth option is to create a stand-alone agency to deal with CT. In essence, a 44th, but national, CT Policing Force.

It will be possible to make a case for each of these options and they each come with specific advantages and disadvantages, some more weighty than others in terms of their impact. We will also need to be conscious of the impact of the introduction of locally elected Police & Crime Commissioners and what this may mean in terms of both future governance and the resourcing demands for national security.

In examining the options for change we not only need to be aware of the public safety aspect and financial consequences but also of the need to be extremely careful that we do not break something that may only need a service rather than an overhaul or re-build. We must also recognise that we didn't get where we are today by accident and that the key interdependencies and relationships with partner agencies and communities may not readily adapt to a simple plug and play process.

For all the potential developments that I have set out, the one thing that has been made clear by the Government is that there will be no change to the current CT arrangements before the Olympic Games. Whilst there is much more planning to be done over the coming months, I am confident that the CT policing structure we have is more than fit for purpose to deliver a safe and secure Games.

Next year as the flame is lit we will face the biggest policing and security challenge that we have ever seen in the United Kingdom. From the 27th July to the 9th September 2012 we will have 14,700 of the world's finest athletes competing in 771 different medal events at 34 different venues with an estimated 9.1 million spectators. The focal point of our Games will be the Olympic Park - itself the size of 357 football pitches - in the heart of East London and a stone's throw from East Ham. On the peak day of travel it is estimated that an additional 800, 000 spectators will take to our public transport network and the whole thing is being covered by 21,000 journalists and broadcasters. It is truly the oldest and greatest show on earth and the world will be watching us and the all consuming priority for myself and colleagues is to deliver a safe and secure Games against the backdrop of challenges that I have outlined.

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